AN 3.28 speech like dung, lying by omission

In AN 3.28 the Buddha sorts people into three kinds by how they speak: speech like dung (gūtha-bhāṇī),
speech like flowers (puppha-bhāṇī),
and speech like honey (madhu-bhāṇī).

The first kind, speech like dung, is the false witness.
Someone is called before a council, an assembly,
a family meeting, a guild, or the royal court,
and asked to testify:

‘ehambho purisa, yaṁ jānāsi taṁ vadehī’ti.
So ajānaṁ vā āha: ‘jānāmī’ti, jānaṁ vā āha: ‘na jānāmī’ti,
apassaṁ vā āha: ‘passāmī’ti, passaṁ vā āha: ‘na passāmī’ti;
iti attahetu vā parahetu vā āmisakiñcikkhahetu vā sampajānamusā bhāsitā hoti.

‘Please, my man, say what you know.’
Not knowing, they say ‘I know.’
Knowing, they say ‘I don’t know.’
Not seeing, they say ‘I see.’
And seeing, they say ‘I don’t see.’
So they deliberately lie for the sake of themselves or another,
or for some trivial worldly reason.

(Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato.
Full sutta: AN 3.28.)

What the sutta doesn’t name

A thread on r/theravada, Speech like dung (AN 3.28),
discussed this sutta.
Here is the comment I left there:

not mentioned in category (1), but IMO belongs in that category,
the lie by omission, and something very similar,
concealing truths by withholding information from the public to allow the public to have wrong ideas.
Ordained Bhikkhus have done this for example.
They technically haven’t lied or say,
“I don’t know” when they actually do know something,
but intentionally remaining silent when they know the truth
would cause the public to hold a different view than if they withheld the truth and from speaking out.
In spirit, that’s a lie by omission, and IMO in the same exact category of proclaiming “I don’t know, I don’t see” when you do actually know the truth.

Why silence can be speech like dung

The sutta’s key word is sampajāna-musā: a lie told while lucidly-discerning.
The witness knows the truth, and speaks so that the assembly ends up believing something else.

The same word defines the monk’s rule against lying: sampajāna-musā-vāde pācittiyaṃ (Pācittiya 1).
That rule is about what you say.

Saying “I don’t know” when you do know is the blatant way to break it.
But there are quieter ways to get the same result.
You can change the subject.
You can leave a discussion thread when someone asks whether you know.
You can use some other evasive maneuver.
None of these says “I don’t know” out loud,
so technically you haven’t committed the vinaya offense of a spoken lie.

But if you stay silent on purpose, lucidly-discerning that your silence will leave people holding a wrong view,
you’ve done what the false witness does.
The words differ, but the knowledge, the intent,
and the result are the same.

To make this concrete, here is a public example of what I had in mind.

The claim

In the SuttaCentral thread What is Vitakka and Vicara?,
a participant quoted Peṭakopadesa 7 to show that the first jhāna involves thinking.
Ven. Sujato answered in post #26, on 22 August 2023 (09:34 UTC),
that the Peṭakopadesa’s examples “are of course illustrative metaphors not definitions.”

Respectfully, I think that misreads the passage.
Here is one of the comparisons in question
(Pe 7.583, as quoted in that thread):

Thinking is like a text-reciter who does his recital silently:
exploring is like his simply contemplating it …
Thinking is the Discrimination of Language and the Discrimination of Perspicuity;
exploring is the Discrimination of Ideas and the Discrimination of Meanings.

In an oral tradition, a reciter going over a text silently is not a figure of speech.
It is literally how the teaching was carried.
You hear the Dhamma, memorize it, recite it,
reflect on it, and explain it to others.
Vitakka and vicāra are the verbal,
communicable language in which that Dhamma is encoded.
That is why MN 44 calls them vacī-saṅkhāra,
speech fabrications.
The same Peṭakopadesa passage ties vitakka to the discrimination of language (nirutti),
which is a definition, not an image.

The Buddha’s contemporaries understood it the same way.
In SN 41.8, the Jain founder Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta scoffs at the idea of a samādhi without vitakka and vicāra;
to him, stopping them is like trying to catch the wind in a net.
The Jain Tattvārtha Sūtra (9.43–44) defines vitarka as scriptural knowledge (śruta),
and vicāra as shifting between an object,
its word, and its activity.
The Upaniṣads, too, belong to an oral culture of hearing,
reciting, and reflecting on sacred texts.

The main point of SN 41.8: Nātaputta rejects only a samādhi without vitakka and vicāra,
that is, the second through fourth jhānas.
He has no objection to a samādhi with them, the first jhāna,
because to him vitakka and vicāra are ordinary thinking,
which in his view never stops.
If he had shared Ven. Sujato’s definition,
in which the first jhāna is already a state beyond thinking,
he would have had to call the first jhāna impossible too,
not just the second through fourth.

More on the Jain side:

The question that was never answered

Two people replied to Ven. Sujato in that thread,
earnestly and courteously:

  • DhammaEnthusiast (#28), 2 September 2023, 11 days later,
    laid out the Peṭakopadesa passages in detail
    and closed with “I look forward to hearing your reply.”
  • Sasha_A (#29), 4 September 2023, 13 days later,
    asked a simple clarifying question about what he meant by “stopping thinking.”

Neither received an answer.
Ven. Sujato has not posted in that thread since.
As of today, that is more than three years of silence on a question that matters.

Why it matters

Ven. Sujato’s translations are probably the most widespread and freely available English translations of the suttas.
They are SuttaCentral’s default, and they are what most newcomers read first.
So when people question how he translates vitakka & vicāra in the jhāna formula,
that is not a private quibble.
It shapes how a very large number of people understand jhāna.

And it doesn’t stop at English.
In Completely wrong German translations of jhāna formula in Saṁyutta Nikāya,
I showed that the German translation on SuttaCentral,
supposedly from the Pāli, renders the first jhāna as “während man den Geist ausrichtet und hält.”
That is Sujato’s English, “directing and holding the mind,” put into German.
The translator said so directly:
“First of all there’s of course Bhante @sujato who provides the English translation on which I mostly rely.”
Who knows how many other languages are doing the same thing,
translating from Sujato’s terms instead of from the Pāli.

A pattern, not an incident

I point to the thread because it is public and permanent,
a record anyone can check for themselves.
It is one visible instance of something that has gone on,
privately and publicly, for more than ten years:
people (not only me) asking Ven. Sujato to justify his interpretation of vitakka & vicāra,
and getting silence in return.

To be fair: taken on its own, with no other context,
one unanswered thread proves nothing.
People get busy, and threads get missed.
I’m not drawing any conclusion of wrongdoing,
or of a lie by omission, from a single incident.

As a long-term pattern, though, it looks very different.
Consider the whole record:

  • More than ten years of challenges to his vitakka & vicāra interpretation,
    private and public, left unanswered.
  • A case built on three suttas, cherry-picked,
    while roughly thirty other suttas that contradict his jhāna interpretation go unaddressed.
    Among the most egregious omissions are
    MN 125, MN 78, MN 111, and AN 9.36.
  • A public question, asked earnestly and courteously, still unanswered after more than three years.

In my view, that is not oversight.
It is deliberate, calculated deception.
Technically, no vinaya rule has been broken: there was no bodily act and no spoken lie.
But in spirit it is a lie by omission.
It belongs in the same category as the false witness in AN 3.28,
who, knowing, says “I don’t know,” and, seeing, says “I don’t see.”
And I do believe it carries serious kammic consequences,
while the public, and now other translators,
go on relying on his interpretation.